Experience

The Bush School of Government & Public Service - Washington, DC

• United States
• Public Policy Offices
• 1 - 100 Employee

• Instructional Assistant Professor

  • Aug 2022 - Present

  Washington, District of Columbia, United States



University of Rochester

• United States
• Higher Education
• 700 & Above Employee

• PHD Student

  • Aug 2017 - Oct 2022

  Rochester, New York Area The role of domestic and international institutions in reducing political risks in foreign direct investment (FDI) has been well studied by extant studies. Yet, one question remains unanswered: why do some foreign investors face more problems than others in the same host country? In other words, how could some firms take greater risks than others? Three essays in my dissertation suggest that firm heterogeneity is the key to answering this question. Firms have diverse political backgrounds and… Show more The role of domestic and international institutions in reducing political risks in foreign direct investment (FDI) has been well studied by extant studies. Yet, one question remains unanswered: why do some foreign investors face more problems than others in the same host country? In other words, how could some firms take greater risks than others? Three essays in my dissertation suggest that firm heterogeneity is the key to answering this question. Firms have diverse political backgrounds and they leverage that against investment risks. The first paper suggests that firms can reduce policy risks by lobbying information. Due to the possibility of costly investor-state disputes, host governments are more willing to avoid damaging the business operation of firms with the available record of lobbying the US government. The second essay finds that foreign ownership of a mine has a restraining effect on armed conflict. The possibility of home countries' military intervention discourages both insurgents and national governments to fight in the vicinity of foreign-owned mining facilities. The third paper argues that multinationals use collusive corruption to hedge political risks from protests. However, a given firms' bribery only works in a district where both senators are from the incumbent party because senators from opposition parties have incentives to increase protests against foreign investors. Show less



Purdue University

• United States
• Higher Education
• 700 & Above Employee

• Graduate Independent Instructor

  • Jan 2017 - May 2017

  Teaching an undergraduate level introductory IPE course (POL 235) for a semester.

• Graduate Lab Instructor

  • Aug 2016 - Dec 2016

  Teaching 3 Lab Sections for Undergraduate Level Political Methodology Course for a semester

• Graduate Research Assistant

  • Jan 2016 - Jul 2016

  On Global Conservation Injustice (PI: Kimberly R. Marion Suiseeya)

• Graduate Teaching Assistant

  • Jan 2015 - Dec 2015

  Intro to International Relations

• Graduate Teaching Assistant

  • Aug 2014 - Dec 2014

  International Law

• Graduate Teaching Assistant

  • Jan 2014 - May 2014

  Governments of the World

• Graduate Teaching Assistant

  • Aug 2013 - Dec 2013

  Environmental Politics



East Asia Institute (EAI)

• South Korea
• International Affairs
• 1 - 100 Employee

• Intern Researcher

  • Mar 2013 - May 2013

  Jung-gu, Seoul, Korea Worked as an intern researcher at the Asia Security Initiative (ASI) Research Center, EAI.



Konkuk University

• South Korea
• Higher Education
• 200 - 300 Employee

• Research Assistant

  • Dec 2012 - Feb 2013

  The Political Empowerment of the Scheduled Castes in India [PI: Jungug Choi, Political Science, Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea]

• Research Assistant

  • Sep 2010 - Aug 2011

  Actor-Network Theory and The Politics of Technology Standard: The Case of Audio Video Coding Standard(AVS) in China [PI: Young Ja Bae, Political Science, Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea]

• Research Assistant

  • Mar 2006 - Mar 2007

  Political Structure of India [PI: Jungug Choi, Political Science, Konkuk University, Seoul, Korea]